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ABSTRACT            
Transport infrastructure provision from roads to waterways involves large amounts of public funds in very 
complex projects. It is hardly a surprise that all across Europe, but especially in high corruption risk countries, 
it is a primary target of corrupt elites. This article provides a state-of-the-art review of the literature on the cost 
of corruption and estimates the level of corruption risks and associated costs in European infrastructure 
development and maintenance in 2009-2014 using novel data on over 40,000 government contracts. Two forms 
of corruption costs are investigated in the empirical section: 1) distorting spending structure and project design, 
and 2) inflating prices. Findings indicate that corruption steers infrastructure spending towards high value as 
opposed to small value investment projects. It also inflates prices by 30-35% on average with largest excesses in 
high corruption risk regions. Contrary to perceptions, corruption risks in infrastructure are decoupled to a 
considerable extent from the national corruption environment. Source data and risk scores are made 
downloadable at digiwhist.eu/resources/data. 
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1. Introduction 
Improving the coverage and quality of transport infrastructure is key for economic development as it is a 
core public good supporting economic transactions, hence growth in general. As building such infrastructure 
involves large amounts of public funds in highly complex projects which are only comprehensible to a few 
experts, it is a primary target of corrupt elites. This is amply evidenced by scandals and trials, perception 
surveys and increasingly objective proxies of corruption. For example, a series of corruption scandals have 
rocked Spanish politics since 2014 when the so-called Gurtel case or the Operación Punica led to the trial and 
imprisonment of over 90 politicians and businessmen on charges of mishandling government contracts, many of 
which linked to transportation infrastructure development (Charron, Dahlström, Fazekas, & Lapuente, 2017). Or 
take the numerous scandals in Italy involving government contracting for large infrastructure such as the 
infamous, never built Messina Straits Bridge3. Corruption in transport infrastructure delivery is hugely important 
as it not only can lead to large amounts wasted, but also compromise their intended beneficial effects. 
Transportation infrastructure investments such as roads, railways, airports or maritime infrastructure represent a 
large part of public spending. Based on OECD statistics4, the investment and maintenance spending on transport 
infrastructure amounted to roughly 1% of the GDP in years between 1995 and 2013 in OECD countries. 
Corruption can also distort spending structure and project design leading to low quality provision and 
unnecessary investments (Kenny, 2006, 2009b; Mauro, 1997). 
The challenge of corruption in transport infrastructure building and maintenance is typically investigated in 
the context of developing countries where the issues are perceived to be more wide-spread (Collier, Kirchberger, 
& Söderbrom, 2015). However, given the qualitative and quantitative evidence of corruption in infrastructure 
across the EU (Becker, Egger, & Ehrlich, 2012) and the region’s increased emphasis on renewing its transport 
infrastructure (e.g. “Junker-plan”), it is timely to review what we know and provide new insights. In particular, 
this article aims (i) to give a comprehensive overview of the existing literature on transport infrastructure 
corruption across the globe, and (ii) to assess corruption risks and associated costs in transport infrastructure 
development across Europe using novel objective corruption proxies. 
The contribution of this article is fourfold. First, it carefully lays out the three main theoretical impact 
mechanisms through which corruption imposes costs on infrastructure provision: spending structure, prices, and 
delivery time and quality. To our surprise, there is a considerable theoretical and empirical unity in the literature 
regarding the nature and amount of costs corruption poses to transport infrastructure development across the 
globe. Second, it uses a novel dataset comprising tens of thousands of transport infrastructure tenders published 
by national governments and the European Commission, recording every single government contract regulated 
by the EU Public Procurement Directives (DG GROWTH, 2015). This data is ideal for analysing corruption 
risks in transport infrastructure investment, as every large project has to go through a formal tendering process, 
leaving us with a close to complete database of large-scale infrastructure delivery all across Europe. Such an 
unprecedented detail of infrastructure delivery reveals considerable variation in terms of corruption risks both 
across and within EU countries. Third, corruption also impacts on spending structure with increased regional 
corruption risks being associated with increased spending on large projects. As larger projects allow for 
concentrating corrupt rents in the hands of a few, it is possible that the distorted spending structure serves 
corrupt goals rather than genuine investment needs. Fourth, increased corruption risks substantially inflate prices 
in Europe. New road construction projects’ unit costs are increased in high corruption risk tenders by up to 30-
35% compared to low corruption risk ones. 
The article is organised as follows: first, we synthetize the existing literature on transport infrastructure-
related corruption. Second, the data used is discussed with particular focus on pros and cons of using ‘Big Data’. 
Third, the empirical analysis proceeds by highlighting simple comparisons across sub-sectors of transport 
infrastructure and European regions then systematically assessing the impact corruption has on prices and 
spending structure. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
2. Conceptual frame 
2.1 What do we know currently about transport infrastructure and corruption? 
Unfortunately, the literature on transport infrastructure corruption is scattered.5 While theoretical works 
deliver clear expectations, most research in this area had to rely on country-level perception-based indices which 
are particularly inadequate in this context as the general population or experts have very little direct experience 
                                                                
3 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/italys-85bn-bridge-to-nowhere-8317312.html  
4 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ITF_INV-MTN_DATA# 
5 Although, Le, Shan, Chan, & Hu (2014) provides an overview on recent corruption research dealing with the construction 
industry,  the literature focusing especially on transport infrastructure is only partly discussed. 
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with transport infrastructure development and can observe corruption in it to a limited degree (Kenny, 2006; 
Olken, 2009). Nevertheless, based on the available theoretical and empirical evidence we can draw up the key 
expectations about the costs of corruption in transport infrastructure which we explore on EU data and a small 
number of benchmark estimations from diverse countries can also be enumerated.  
Investment into transport infrastructure is thought to be of particularly high corruption risk based on 
perception data, high profile scandals, and theoretical considerations (Golden & Picci, 2005; Kenny, 2007). 
Infrastructure development tends to imply large, long-term and complex projects each of which are conducive to 
corruption. In large projects, even a small fraction of the investment value amounts to large corruption rents 
making them particularly attractive (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In case of long term investments such as transport 
infrastructure, the situation is further complicated as the gains of corruption – e.g. through building in less/low 
quality material – are realized early on, while costs arise only later. Complex projects are characterised by high 
degrees of information asymmetry which makes it harder to detect misconduct in terms of inflated prices, 
inferior quality, or sluggish delivery (Golden & Picci, 2005; Kenny, 2007). In addition, complex projects can 
require highly specialised skills and capacities which give rise to monopoly power and pricing making the 
detection and punishment of misconduct even more difficult. However, the results of transport infrastructure 
projects in terms of bridges and roads are highly visible to voters and donor agencies and infrastructure failure 
has the potential to damage many lives leading to investigations of construction works delivered. These together 
should in principle curb corruption in transport infrastructure development at least to some degree. As some of 
these characteristics such as complexity are also present in other types of government contracting such as IT 
development or legal services, it has to be investigated to what degree transport infrastructure delivery is prone 
to corruption risks compared to other sectors in Europe. This is a fundamental question as there is no study 
comparing transport investment with other investment types in terms of corruption prevalence using objective 
data, and relying on perceptions and high-profile scandals may be misleading (Kenny, 2006; Olken, 2009). 
Corruption can occur at any phase of the investment cycle inflicting different costs on societies and 
implying different mitigation strategies (Benitez, Estache, & Soreide, 2010; Kenny, 2006, 2009a). Strategic 
planning for new projects, the tendering process, or the contract implementation phase each is prone to 
corruption. Nevertheless, corruption in transport infrastructure provision can compromise public goals in at least 
three direct ways: 1) distorting spending structure and project design; 2) inflating prices for a given quality; and 
3) contributing to delayed and low quality provision, in extreme cases non-completion. Each of these are 
reviewed briefly in order to focus to the subsequent empirical analysis. 
First, corruption in transport infrastructure provision is likely to distort spending structure, in particular to 
bias public investment towards high value, high complexity investments into new infrastructure as opposed to 
spending on maintenance and operations. Spending distortions can have an alternative explanation as discussed 
by another strand of political economy literature focusing on temporal commitment problems (see e.g. Dixit, 
1998). Voters may force governments to commit to inefficiently high value projects (i.e. new transport 
infrastructure instead of maintenance) so that the choice of future governments is restricted, even though it 
would not have been preferred ex post (Glazer, 1989). Interestingly, such long-term commitment devices may 
also serve clientelism in as much as large projects cement long term rents enjoyed by a favoured community 
even if political leadership changes. 
This expected distortion is demonstrated by Tanzi & Davoodi (1997) who show that higher level of 
corruption in a country (measured by perception indices) is associated with increased public investment, but 
with lower expenditures on operations and maintenance. Similarly, Mauro (1998) shows, that country-level 
corruption is negatively associated with the share of education-related government expenditure in GDP, and this 
relationship is robust to a number of alternative explanations such as prior level of development. In an approach 
more closely associated to this article’s empirical analysis, Lukács & Fazekas (2015) point out that while the 
highest value and highest corruption risk procurement tenders are in infrastructure provision in Hungary, the 
average corruption risk of the sector is not particularly high. Their findings suggest that at least some of our 
focus on corruption in infrastructure may be driven by salient cases rather than a solid understanding of the 
overall risk profile of sectors. Given these considerations and data limitations, it has to be investigated to what 
degree corruption biases transport infrastructure spending towards high value projects in Europe. 
Second, corruption in transport infrastructure provision is likely to increase prices even when taking 
project specifications as given (summary of research findings are in Table 1). Price inflation can manifest itself 
in for example wages or material costs in the awarded contract or only later during contract implementation 
(European Court of Auditors, 2013). Although without connecting it to corruption risks per se,  Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, & Buhl (2003) shows that price escalation (i.e. cost overrun) is indeed a common phenomenon in case of 
transport infrastructure projects both for road, rail and fixed links (bridges and tunnels), and although in a 
varying magnitude it is evidenced in developed and developing countries as well. Furthermore, Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, & Buhl (2004) also shows that price escalation is strongly affected by the length of the implementation 
phase, hence underlying the connection between costs and implementation period (see below).  
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Evidence from Italy contrasting data on cumulative investment into infrastructure and its available stock 
shows how region-level corruption in infrastructure positively correlates with the price of infrastructure even 
after controlling for input costs such as labour costs or construction material prices (Golden & Picci, 2005). 
Analysis of road prices in low and middle income countries using the World Bank’s ROCKS dataset show that 
country-level corruption risks as measured by perception indices such as Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index or the World Governance Indicators Control of Corruption indicator increase prices 
between 7 and 11% (Collier, Kirchberger, & Söderbrom, 2015). While percentage price differences might 
appear as small, given the high value of many infrastructure projects, the absolute costs are high which is also 
demonstrated by research looking at absolute unit prices such as Alexeeva, Queiroz, & Ishihara (2011). In their 
approach which is more directly related to ours, they shows that an additional procurement red flag is associated 
with an average 91,000 – 100,000 USD/KM price increase on a unique sample of European and Central Asian 
road projects. These results are reached on a contract-level analysis controlling for geographical differences and 
economic development. This literature suggests that the effect of corruption risk on infrastructure prices in 
terms of % increase or total EUR increase should be explored empirically in Europe. 
 
Table 1. Summary table of estimations for the cost of corruption in infrastructure 
Studies Countries Years 
Products 
investigated 
Corruption measure used Cost estimate 
(Alexeeva et 
al., 2011) 
Albania, Armenia, 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, 
Ukraine 
2000-2010 
road rehabilitation 
and reconstruction 
Red flags, such as cost 
increases during 
implementation, time 
overruns, high proportion 
of prequalified companies 
not bidding etc. 
One additional red 
flag (from 10) is 
associated with 91-
100 thousand USD 
cost increase per km 
(Pricewaterho
use Coopers, 
2013) 
8 EU Member States 2010 
road and rail 
construction; 
water and waste; 
urban and utility 
construction 
Binary corruption 
indicator, based on a model 
prediction 
In case of road and 
rail construction 1.9-
2.9%, water and 
waste 1.8-2.5%, 
urban and utility 
construction 4.8-
6.6% of the total 
procured value 
(Collier et al., 
2015) 
99 low and middle 
income countries 
included in the World 
Bank’s ROCKS 
database 
1984-2008 
road development 
and road 
preservation 
works 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators – control of 
corruption; Transparency 
International’s 2008 
Corruption Perception 
Index 
Countries above the 
median corruption 
level (WGI) have 
15% higher unit 
costs; One point 
increase on a ten-
point scale of the TI 
corruption index 
increases costs by 
7% 
(Olken, 2007) Indonesia 2003-2004 road construction 
Difference between the 
claimed expenditures and 
the independent engineer’s 
estimate 
Increasing 
monitoring from 4% 
to 100% of projects 
reduced average 
missing expenditure 
from 27.7% to 
19.2% 
(Kenny, 2007) 22 transition countries 1999-2000 construction Survey questions 
The cost of securing 
government 
contracts is 
approximately 7% 
of the contract value 
(Meduri & 
Annamalai, 
2012) 
India 1996-2010 road construction 
Petty corruption index 
constructed by (TI, 2005) 
470 thousand USD 
increase per lane km 
due to one standard 
deviation increase of 
petty corruption 
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Third, corruption in transport infrastructure can contribute to delayed and low quality provision, in 
extreme cases failed completion altogether (Lewis-Faupel, Neggers, Olken, & Pande, 2014). In EU funded road 
projects in 2000-2013, the average delay was 41% or 9 months of the initial estimate (European Court of 
Auditors, 2013). Significant time overruns (6 to 12 month) were also apparent in a range of Eastern European 
and Central Asian countries’ road projects financed by the World Bank (Alexeeva, Queiroz, & Ishihara 2011). 
Similarly, in a wide set of African developing countries also experienced more than a year delay in contract 
implementation in their World Bank funded road projects (Alexeeva et al., 2008). Delayed provision and long 
implementation is also fertile ground for inflating costs as it is pointed out in Flyvbjerg et al. (2004). Although, 
time overruns are not straightforward indications of corruption (complex projects can have unforeseen 
complications), weak supervision and enforcement of the initial contracts give rise to corruption risks. While 
construction delays are easy to detect, assessing implementation quality is less straightforward (e.g. the effects 
are only visible after years). Gillanders (2013) – using World Bank survey data – shows that perceived 
corruption is significantly and positively related to the percentage of firms identifying transportation (i.e. its 
quality) as a major constraint both at the country and regional level.  
Furthermore, the existing literature also shows, that there can be anomalies without rigorous monitoring of 
project implementation. Based on independent engineers’ ex post estimates, an approximately 8% decrease was 
found in unexplained material costs due to increased monitoring in road projects in Indonesian villages (Olken, 
2007). Despite the clearly relevant corruption risks at the implementation stage, due to the lack of adequate data 
and the complexity of the quality-corruption relationship, the connection between corruption risks and delayed 
or low quality provision cannot be tested here. While there is probably the scantest thorough research on project 
non-completions, they are likely to represent the most sever corruption harm and can become systemic at certain 
places6. The tragedy of unfinished infrastructure projects is that without full completion, most projects cannot be 
used at all. 
While these different forms of direct corruption costs in transport infrastructure provision may occur jointly 
or substitute for each other, they are likely to carry different total social costs. If corruption only increases the 
price of infrastructure without impacting on project design, infrastructure quality, delivery time, or overall 
completion, total social cost is close to the direct cost. However, if corruption’s direct impact goes beyond 
prices, additional indirect costs are likely inflicted on the society such as non-available infrastructure or 
unreliable provision. These issues we cannot discuss in details as their measurement is beyond the framework of 
this article.  
2.2 Measuring corruption risks 
While there has been a lot of controversy over how to best define corruption (Johnston, 1996), we have 
adopted a definition which is specific to the domain of public procurement, backed up by legal principles and 
deeply rooted in the governance literature going back to the Weberian notion of impartial government 
(Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In addition, this definition is also widely used by practitioners around the globe: In 
public procurement, the aim of institutionalised corruption is to steer the contract to the favoured bidder without 
detection in a recurrent and organised fashion (Fazekas & Tóth, 2014; World Bank, 2009). This requires at least 
two violations of principles of impartial distribution of public resources: 1) avoiding competition, by for 
example using unjustified sole sourcing or direct contract awards; and 2) favouring a certain bidder, by for 
example tailoring specifications, or sharing inside information. This definition of corruption focuses attention on 
restricted access to and unfair competition for public resources (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; North, Wallis, & 
Weingast, 2009). Restricted and unfair access then translates into higher prices, lower quality and quantity in 
order to generate corruption rents. Such rents may be extracted in the form of bribes, but it is more typical to 
channel rents through broker firms, subcontracts, offshore companies, and bogus consultancy contracts to name 
a few typical instruments. As public procurement and especially infrastructure delivery involves huge sums, the 
typical institutionalised corruption scenario involves elites from both the public and private sectors such as 
elected officials, high-level bureaucrats, and wealthy businessmen. 
The measures of corruption risk used in this article directly stem from the above definition and follow work 
of the authors elsewhere discussed extensively both single country and cross-country analyses (Charron et al., 
2017; Fazekas, Chvalkovská, Skuhrovec, Tóth, & King, 2014; Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2016). We understand 
corruption risk indicators as metrics ranging between 0 and 1 whose values suggest the risk of corruption to 
occur, but without an exact empirically verified relationship between corrupt acts and the risk scores (hence we 
don’t use the term corruption probability). 
The measurement approach exploits the fact that for institutionalised corruption to work, procurement 
contracts have to be awarded recurrently to companies belonging to the corrupt network. This can only be 
                                                                
6 E.g. as a recent documentary put it, “unfinished Italy” is probably the most important Italian architectural style since the 2nd 
World War till now”. (http://www.unfinished-italy.com/) 
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achieved if legally prescribed rules of competition and openness are circumvented. By implication, it is possible 
to identify the input side of the corruption process, that is fixing the procedural rules for limiting competition, 
and also the output side of corruption, that is signs of limited competition. By measuring the degree of unfair 
restriction of competition in public procurement, a proxy indicator of corruption can be obtained. 
First, the simplest and most conservative indication of restricted competition in line with the above 
definition is when only one bid is submitted to a tender on an otherwise competitive market (output side). While 
single bidding might also reflect non-corrupt behaviour such as contract renewal, its widespread presence over 
longer periods across many procuring bodies is more likely to signal systematic deviations from competitive 
norms. Hence, the percentage of single-bidder contracts awarded with all the contracts is the most 
straightforward corruption proxy we use.  
Second, a more complex indicator of institutionalised corruption also incorporates characteristics of the 
tendering process that are in the hands of public officials who conduct the tender and suggests deliberate 
competition restriction (input side) (Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2013). This composite indicator, which we call the 
Corruption Risk Index (CRI), represents the risk of corrupt contract award in public procurement, and is 
constructed as a simple weighted average of individual red flags. CRI = 0 indicates minimum corruption risk 
while CRI=1 denotes maximum corruption risk observed. Based on qualitative interviews of corruption in the 
public procurement process, a review of the literature (OECD, 2007; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2013; World 
Bank, 2009), and regression analysis, we identified the components of the CRI in addition to single bidding: 
1. A simple way to fix tenders is to avoid the publication of the call for tenders in the official 
public procurement journal as this would make it harder for competitors to prepare a bid. This is 
only considered in non-open procedures as in open procedures publication is mandatory 
(Lengwiler & Wolfstetter, 2006). 
2. While open competition is relatively hard to avoid in some tendering procedure types such as open 
procedures, others such as accelerated negotiated or negotiated without competition procedures are 
by default much less competitive; hence, using less open and transparent procedure types can 
indicate the deliberate limitation of competition, that is corruption risks (Chong, Klien, & Saussier, 
2015). 
3. If the advertisement period, i.e. the number of days between publishing a tender and the 
submission deadline, is too short for preparing an adequate bid, especially for large tenders 
considered in this study, it can serve corrupt purposes; whereby the issuer informally tells the well-
connected company about the opportunity well ahead (Piga, 2011).  
4. Different types of evaluation criteria are prone to manipulation to different degrees, subjective, 
hard-to-quantify criteria often accompany rigged assessment procedures as it creates room for 
discretion and limits accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2007). 
5. If the time used for deciding on the submitted bids is excessively short or lengthened by legal 
challenge, it can also signal corruption risks. Snap decisions on large value tenders may reflect 
premediated assessment, while legal challenge and the corresponding long decision period suggests 
outright violation of laws (Heggstad & Froystad, 2011).  
Regression analysis was used to identify ‘red flags’ which are most likely to signal corruption rather than 
any other phenomena such as low administrative capacity (full regression details can be found in Appendix A. 
Ultimately, those variables were selected which were large and significant predictors of single bidder contracts. 
The regression set-up controlled for a number of likely confounders of bidder numbers: (1) institutional 
endowments measured by type of issuer (e.g. municipal, national), (2) product market and technological 
specificities measured by CPV division of products procured, (3) contract size (log contract value in EUR), and 
(4) regulatory changes as proxied by year of contract award. Regressions were run for each country separately in 
order to best capture national specificities of corruption technologies and institutional endowments. We 
restricted the sample used in the regression analysis and eventually for defining corruption proxies in two ways: 
1) Competitive markets: we only examine tenders in markets with at least 10 contracts awarded throughout 
2009-2014, where markets are defined by product type (CPV level 3) and location (NUTS level 1). 2) Regulated 
tenders: we only used those tenders which are above EU thresholds in order to avoid the noise of too small 
contracts and voluntary reporting which follows erratic patterns across countries and over time. These together 
excluded 17% of the original sample. 
The logic of regression analysis is the following: if in a certain country, not publishing the call for tenders in 
the official journal for open procedures is associated with a higher probability of a single bidder contract award, 
it is likely that avoiding the transparent and easily accessible publication of a tender is typically used for limiting 
competition. This would imply that call for tenders not published in the official journal becomes part of the 
analysed country’s CRI. Taking another example, if we found that leaving only 5 or fewer days for bidders to 
submit their bids is associated with a higher probability of a single bidder contract compared to periods longer 
than 20 days (a category mandated by many procurement regulations as golden standard), this would indicate 
that extremely short advertisement periods are often used to limiting competition. Then this would provide 
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sufficient grounds to include the ‘5 or fewer days‘ category of the advertisement period variable in the CRI of 
the country in question. Following this logic, in addition to the outcome variable of these regressions (single 
bidding) only those variables are included in CRI which are in line with our corrupt contracting model, that is 
which are significant and large predictors of single bidding. Once the list of elementary corruption risk 
indicators is determined with the help of the above regressions, each of the variables and their categories receive 
a component weight in order to scale CRI to the 0 and 1 band. 
Each of the two corruption risk indicators have its pros and cons. They are both preferable over widely used 
perception indicators as they directly point at specific corruption risks reflecting actor behaviour as captured by 
objective data. The strength of the single bidder indicator is that it is very simple and straightforward to 
interpret. However, it is also more prone to gaming by corrupt actors due to its simplicity (e.g. faking 
competition by submitting another, deliberately losing bid). The strength of the composite indicator approach 
(CRI) is that while individual strategies of corruption may change as the environment changes, they are likely to 
be replaced by other techniques. Therefore, the composite indicator is a more robust proxy of corruption over 
time than a single variable approach. In an international comparative perspective, a further strength of CRI is 
that it balances national specificities with international comparability by allowing for the exact list and 
formulation of the components to vary reflecting differences in local market conditions and corrupt practices 
(e.g. in some countries short advertisement periods are rare and are not systematically associated with a 
heightened probability of single bidding, hence the national CRI does not include this component). Hence, CRI 
in an international comparative perspective captures the frequency of likely corrupt behaviours in each context 
while abstracting from the specific procedural details. The main weakness of CRI is that it can only capture a 
subset of corruption strategies used, hence it may be a biased measure of corruption. 
It can be argued that both corruption proxies capture the simplest and most straightforward signs of 
competition restriction, hence they miss out on sophisticated types of corruption such as corruption combined 
with inter-bidder collusion. This is problematic in as much as corruption in infrastructure is frequently combined 
with collusive bidding as for example extensive market transparency and high entry costs encourage cartels 
(Klemperer, 2007; Tóth, Fazekas, Czibik, & Tóth, 2014). 
As each of the above corruption proxies can be associated with non-corrupt phenomena, we need to look at 
external validity tests to demonstrate that they are more often linked to corrupt phenomena than other 
behaviours. The simplest such test is comparing objective corruption proxies with corruption perceptions which 
provides a strong support to our interpretation of the data (Figure 1). As country-level perceptions might be 
biased in a number of ways, we also need to conduct micro-level validity tests using other objective corruption 
risk proxies. One such widely accepted proxy is the registration of companies in tax haven jurisdictions such as 
Panama (Shaxson & Christensen, 2014). Hence, it is expected that a contract represents a higher corruption risk 
if it is awarded to a company registered in a tax haven as its secrecy allows for hiding illicit money flows. In line 
with our expectations, all across the EU27 plus Norway there is a marked and significant difference in the 
percentage of single bidder contracts won by foreign companies registered in tax havens versus those which are 
not: 0.28 versus 0.26; similarly for CRI: 0.34 versus 0.31 respectively (Ncontract=28,642). For further validity 
tests and validating applications, see (Charron et al., 2017; Fazekas & Kocsis, 2017; Klasnja, 2016). 
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Panel II 
 
 
Figure 1. Bivariate relationship between WGI-Control of Corruption (2013) and corruption proxies: 
single bidder ratio and average CRI (period averages for 2009-2013), EU-27+Norway 
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3. Public procurement data 
The database we use derives from public procurement announcements of 2009-2014 in the EU27 (i.e. EU28 
minus Malta) (this database is called Tenders Electronic Daily (TED)7, which is the online version of the 
'Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU, dedicated to European public procurement.) (DG GROWTH, 
2015). The data represents a complete database of all public procurement procedures conducted under the EU 
Public Procurement Directives. The database was released by the European Commission - DG GROWTH which 
also has conducted a series of data quality checks and enhancements. TED contains variables appearing in 1) 
calls for tenders, and 2) contract award notices. All the countries’ public procurement legislation is within the 
framework of the EU Public Procurement Directive and are therefore, by and large, comparable. The TED 
database contains over 2.8 million contracts for the 27 EU Member States considered. 
For most calculations, we restricted the sample to contracts directly linked to transport infrastructure 
development types readily identifiable in the CPV nomenclature8: roads, railways, airports and water transport 
(Table 2).9 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of spending on main infrastructure types, TED database, EU27, 2009-
2014 
Infrastructure type mean (million EUR) total (million EUR) Ncontracts 
Roads 6.3 134,652 31,139 
Railway 19.7 57,220 4,027 
Airports 5.2 2,948 751 
Water transport 6.7 20,668 4,124 
4. Corruption risks, prices, spending structure in European infrastructure sector 
4.1 Mapping corruption risks in infrastructure delivery across Europe 
Looking at corruption risks in transport infrastructure related public procurement tenders across Europe as 
measured by objective indicators partially confirms widely held perceptions while partially contradicting them 
too. On the one hand, the simplest indicator of corruption risk we employ – single bidding - suggests that 
countries which are perceived to be most corrupt in general are the ones having the highest risk of corruption in 
transport related investments (Figure 2). These countries are mainly Central- and Eastern European countries, 
and Italy which have about 2-3 times higher share of contracts with a single bidder than their Western European 
counterparts. Given that single bidder contracts are on average 20% more expensive10 than contracts with 
multiple bidders, such macro differences translate into tangible and large costs to public budgets.  
                                                                
7 http://ted.europa.eu/  
8 Detailed CPV codes can be found in Appendix C. 
9 Contract-level data on infrastructure provision including the risk scores used in this article are accessible at www.digiwhist.eu 
and www.governancereport.org. 
10 The relative contract value – i.e. the ratio of the final price and the estimated price – is around 1 in case of single bidding, 
while only 0.83 in case of multiple bidders in case of transport related infrastructure tenders. For more on relative contract 
values see section 4.3. 
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Figure 2. Average share of single-bidder tenders of transport infrastructure related public 
procurement tenders by countries (2009-2014) 
 
On the other hand, looking at the regional level unveils significantly more diverse patterns (Figure 3). The 
share of single bidder transport infrastructure contracts varies greatly within countries and in some cases such as 
the UK, Spain or France, a few regions greatly underperform compared to the national average making them 
more similar to Central and Eastern European regions rather than the rest of their own countries. These large 
within-country differences at least partially reflect decentralized infrastructure decision making (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2006). 
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Figure 3. Average share of single-bidder tenders of transport infrastructure related public procurement 
tenders by NUTS2 regions11 
 
 This diversity of corruption risks within countries is paralleled by sectorial differences all across the EU. 
When comparing transport infrastructure tenders to other construction and non-construction related tenders the 
findings are surprising (Figure 4). The prevalence of single bidding outside the construction sector is roughly 2-
3 times higher in every major EU region (for full definition of macro regions see Appendix B). However, the 
picture remains unaltered when we look at transport related investments only.  
                                                                
11 Figure 3 shows the average share of single-bidder tenders by NUTS-2 regions. Where there were no observations on the 
NUTS-2 level, the average of the NUTS-1 level single-bidder share was used. 
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Figure 4. % of single bidder contracts in major European regions according to sectors 12, 2009-2014 
   
Finally, the transport sector in itself is highly diverse, depending on the type of transport infrastructure built 
(Table 3). According to both the simple and complex measures of corruption risks, airport related contracts are 
the highest risk. Surprisingly, road construction scores are the best among transportation types analysed which 
may contradict some perceptions. From a theoretical perspective these results are hardly surprising, more 
specific large value tenders with relatively few providers are more prone to corruption. Looking at the time 
trends reveals that while corruption risks of road and water transport related construction decreased slightly in 
our period, rail and air transport related risks increased (Figure 5). 
While the objective corruption proxies are the best which are available for such analysis, they may 
understate corruption risks in a number of ways. For example, sophisticated tactics of limiting competition such 
as companies taking turns in winning in a cartel (see e.g. (Tóth et al., 2014)) or non-observed corruption risks 
such as price increases during implementation are potential reasons for lower than expected risks in some 
sectors and regions. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of different infrastructure types according to % single bidder and 
CRI, TED database, EU27, 2009-2014 
  
Mean single 
bidder share 
SD of single 
bidder share 
Mean 
CRI 
SD of 
CRI 
Number of 
contracts 
Road construction 9% 0.28 0.18 0.15 25,581 
Railway construction 12% 0.32 0.23 0.21 2,822 
Airport construction 24% 0.43 0.26 0.21 635 
Water transport 12% 0.33 0.22 0.19 3,328 
 
 
                                                                
12 ‘Non-construction (public works)’ contains all tenders referred as „works” by contract type excluding construction works 
based on CPV code (i.e. excluding all contracts under 45000000-7 (Construction works) CPV category), while ‘construction 
(public works)’ only contains tenders under 45000000-7 CPV category within “works”. 
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Figure 5. CRI values across years by infrastructure categories, TED database, EU27, 2009-2014 
4.2 Impact of corruption on infrastructure spending structure 
As discussed above, corruption can distort government spending structure in many ways such as leading to 
over-investment into new infrastructure projects to the detriment of maintaining existing infrastructure. In this 
section, we explore how corruption risks are associated with high value hence more complex projects across 
Europe. 
We use the same narrowly defined transport infrastructure sample as before. Spending structure is proxied 
by a simple measure: the share of the three largest projects within total spending13. If this indicator takes a high 
value, i.e. close to 100%, it suggests that government spending on infrastructure is dominated by a few high 
value, hence complex projects. In order to best capture the variation in corruption risks demonstrated above, the 
analysis is conducted on the regional level by transportation infrastructure types (i.e. each observation 
corresponding to a NUTS-2 region-transportation type-year combination). The regional categorization is based 
on the place of project implementation, hence centrally purchased projects are assigned to regions using the 
location of contract performance which reflects the focus on implementation risks. Corruption risks are 
measured by the more comprehensive Corruption Risk Index (CRI) variable for contracts awarded.  
Although, this narrowly defined calculation leads to a relatively high share of the three largest projects 
(approximately 80%), there is large enough variance to investigate the relationship between corruption risks and 
the share of the largest projects by region14. Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the average CRI and the 
share of the three largest projects across Europe. We find a rather weak positive relationship between the two 
variables which is particularly pronounced for high corruption risk regions (i.e. regions with higher than 0.4 
CRI).  This suggests that it is especially high degrees of corruption amounting to systematic corruption in a 
region which is most influential on project size distributions. 
                                                                
13 This approach is similar to the simple concentration measures used in competition policy (i.e. market share of the top 4 
companies). Using similar measures of concentration (e.g.𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚 = ∑ (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where m stands 
for a given ‘market’ corresponding to a NUTS-2 region-infrastructure sector-year combination), leads to analogous results as 
Figure 6 and Table 4 presents, i.e. high average corruption risks are associated with more concentrated market structures. A 
further alternative is using the top 5 contracts rather than top 3 contracts. Again the below results are analogous. Full 
calculations can be obtained from the authors. 
14 Note: we include only those observations having at least six tenders. 
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Figure 6. Share of 3 largest infrastructure contracts in total transport infrastructure spending and 
Corruption Risk Index, 2009-2014, Nregion-year-sector=493 
 As both the share of the largest projects and its relationship with corruption risks can be driven by many 
unobserved factors, this connection is further investigated using linear regression analysis (OLS=ordinary least 
squares method). Since it is likely, that project size depends on the overall coverage and quality of the existing 
infrastructure, and also on the related policies and institutions (e.g. whether design or maintenance is procured 
together with construction works etc.), regression models include country and transportation infrastructure type 
dummy variables to control for these factors. Also, as the contract size of public works differs significantly from 
services and supplies, we include the share of public works contracts to control for its effect on the top three 
project’s share. Furthermore, we also enter a regional GDP15 measure to control for the level of development, 
the number of contracts to remove market size distortions, and year dummies to control for any time trends. 
After including this wide range of control factors, the size of the CRI effect on spending concentration 
becomes significant and remains positive, indicating that corruption risks have an independent impact on 
spending structure even after taking into account major institutional and contract-related factors (Table 4). The 
fact that the estimated effect becomes significant in the more complex models shows that the above seemingly 
weak relationship in Figure 6 was confounded by these factors. In the most complete model with highest 
explanatory factor, increasing CRI for example from a low corruption risk Danish region (DK04) to a high 
corruption risk Czech region (CZ07) (increasing CRI by 0.36) is associated with an approximately 6.3% point 
increase in the largest three projects’ share in total spending. All other control variables have the expected sign, 
e.g. higher share of public works contracts leads to a higher share of the largest infrastructure projects, while 
higher number of distinct contracts is associated with a smaller share. 
In order to test the robustness of these relationships we considered two alternative specifications in 
Appendix D. First, considering that corruption risks may take a specific form in larger value infrastructure 
projects, we calculated a transport infrastructure specific corruption risk index (recall, the CRI used in the 
analysis has been developed using the economy-wide sample of contracts awarded which makes it suitable for 
cross-sectoral comparisons). Confirming our main model, the sector specific CRI effects on spending 
concentration are very similar to the ones estimated with the economy-wide CRI (Table D1). We continue 
reporting the broader economy-wide CRI results throughout the main text and delegate the alternative 
                                                                
15 The logarithm of the average NUTS-2 level GDP (EUR per inhabitant) was used (Eurostat), as a control for regional 
development. 
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calculations to Appendix D in order to retain comparability with other research using the same CRI formulation. 
Second, in order to control for potential regional confounders not captured by regional GDP, we also run the 
regression models with region-sector fixed-effects which also show positive and significant relationship with 
spending concentration, while the CRI coefficients are even larger (Table D2). 
 
Table 4. OLS regressions explaining the share of 3 largest infrastructure contracts in total transport 
infrastructure spending, 2009-2014, region-year-sector observations 
Model Nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: share of 3 largest contracts 
avg. regional CRI 0.182 0.164 0.200* 0.176* 
 (0.169) (0.230) (0.015) (0.042) 
     
Public works share 0.177** 0.173** 0.182*** 0.179*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Ref.cat.: Road     
     
Rail  0.0403 0.0171 -0.00886 
  (0.317) (0.631) (0.809) 
     
Airport  0.0399 0.00151 -0.0138 
  (0.719) (0.988) (0.892) 
     
Water transport  0.0251 0.0228 0.00721 
  (0.435) (0.483) (0.856) 
     
# of contracts    -0.00543* 
    (0.011) 
     
Country control   X X 
     
Year control   X X 
     
GDP control    X 
Observations 493 493 493 454 
R-squared 0.065 0.071 0.255 0.343 
Notes: p-values in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; standard errors clustered by country 
4.3 Impact of corruption on infrastructure prices 
Transportation infrastructure development typically involves the procurement of complex public works 
making it difficult to measure prices. Given suitable resources, complex projects can be broken down into 
constitutive standard components such as labour costs, price of electricity used, or price of concrete built-in 
(European Court of Auditors, 2013). In the absence of such detailed information this article adopted two 
complementary strategies for estimating the impact of corruption risks on transport infrastructure prices. First, 
relative contract value, the ratio of actual contract value at contract award divided by originally estimated 
contract value at the call for tender stage (i.e. consultant’s estimate), was used, which is a standard, widely 
available measure of prices (Coviello & Mariniello, 2014). This ratio gives a rough estimate of price savings a 
tender achieved compared to the initial estimate. Second, unit prices could be calculated for a small set of new 
road construction contracts across Europe. This approach relies on the publicly available records in TED 
announcements which are often too imprecise for unit cost calculations hence the available sample is tiny 
compared to the whole infrastructure sector. The relative precision of calculations were traded off against scope 
of the sample, while our aim remained to get a better understanding about the magnitude of cost effects of 
corruption. 
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First, relative contract values increase in almost every EU Member State as a function of both corruption 
proxies – single bidding and CRI - in transport infrastructure contracts after controlling for usual determinants 
of prices such as transport infrastructure sub-sector, year, contract size, and contracting body characteristics 
such as main sector and type (full multilevel modelling regression outputs can be found in Table D3, with a 
confirmatory robustness test using the transport investment specific CRI in Table D4). Overall, all across the 
EU, CRI’s total effect size amounts to 17%, that is increasing corruption risks from CRI=0 to CRI=1 is 
associated with about 17% points higher contract value compared to the original estimate. More realistically, an 
additional red flag (1/6 CRI score ~ 0.166) is associated with a 3% point higher prices compared to the original 
estimate. The estimated effect of CRI on relative prices per country is depicted in Figure 7. Interestingly, the 
strength of the relationship between corruption risks and prices greatly varies across countries with high 
corruption risk countries such as Poland, Slovakia and Italy displaying the strongest relationship with some low 
corruption risk countries also displaying a relatively strong relationship such as Finland16. In Poland for 
example, adding one red flag is associated with roughly 6% point higher transportation infrastructure prices. In 
order words, foregone savings amount to about 6% of the original estimated contract value. 
 
 
Figure 7. Average price increase as a function of Corruption Risk Index (regression coefficient), %, 
transport infrastructure, 2009-2014, Ncontract= 10,600 
Note: *=country specific effect different from 0 at the 10% level.  
 
Second, the price of constructing 1 kilometre of new motorway differs greatly in Europe, apparently quite in 
the opposite direction than input prices such as labour or electricity would suggest making Spanish motorways 
                                                                
16 Recall that Figure 7 only depicts the strength of relationship between corruption risks and relative contract values, which 
may or may not correlate with the prevalence of corruption risks in the country. For example, corruption risks are high in 
Bulgaria, but their estimated price impact is relatively muted, while there are very low corruption risks in Ireland, but their 
impact on prices is well above the EU average. 
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over 70% more expensive than German motorways (European Court of Auditors, 2013). At least some of these 
huge price differences can be explained by corruption risks according to our regression analysis. We regressed 
the  contract-level average unit price for road and express road construction on CRI in 2010-2014 across the 
whole EU in a hand-collected sample of new express road and road construction projects neither of which 
included maintenance or design costs17. The regressions control for macro region (e.g. Western Europe), road 
length (km), road type (express road or road), development complexity (e.g. including bridge), geographical 
features (Shannon Evenness Index18), and civil engineering price level. According to such a simple regression, 
moving from the CRI of an average Bulgarian to an average Swedish road construction project (i.e. ~1.5 
standard deviation increase or ~1 additional red flag) is associated with a EUR 1.2 million or ~35%19 increase in 
the cost of 1 kilometre new road construction compared to the average road price in the sample (Table 5). The 
exact size of the estimated effect of corruption risks differs somewhat according to the control factors included 
in the regressions, but the overall relationship and its magnitude remains by and large the same, in the order of 
30-35%20. 
Our estimations using newly collected data confirm prior research using independent samples and 
somewhat different methods. In the most directly comparable article using World Bank financed projects’ data, 
one additional red flag is associated with a price increase of 30-40% compared to the mean km price (Alexeeva 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, key informant interviews in Hungary suggest about a 50% price increase in highway 
construction projects in the late 2000s (Fazekas et al., 2013). In some cases, the cost of corruption could be even 
higher as suggested by a recent 29 km highway construction project in Hungary (M4 motorway between 
Budapest-Szolnok). It was initially won by a consortium of 5 construction companies, with a stunning 12.6 
million EUR/km cost level on probably the flattest part of the country. A comparably low-lying and flat terrain 
motorway construction project (Motorway A20, Grimmen-East to Strasburg) was audited by the European 
Court of Auditors calculating a 4.3 million EUR/km price, roughly one third of the Hungarian M4 price 
(European Court of Auditors, 2013). Most interestingly, the faith of the project seems to follow political-
personal conflicts rather than engineering or economic calculation: initially a company called Közgép plc. was 
also among the winners which saw its public procurement revenue skyrocket after the 2010 government change 
and is owned by the high school roommate of the Prime Minister who also happened to be the ex-treasurer of 
the governing party. However, soon after the Prime Minister and the former roommate had a public fall-out, the 
project was halted, no further payment was made, and allegations of bid rigging were investigated21. 
  
                                                                
17 The exclusion of tenders also containing maintenance or design costs was based on the publicly available tender descriptions 
published on the TED website which was not detailed in every case making sample  selection uncertain at places. 
18 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Shannon_evenness_index_%28SEI%29  
19 Note that effect magnitudes between road unit-price and relative price models are not directly comparable as they relate to 
different samples and their baselines are different: relative prices use the initial cost estimate to measure changes in percentage 
points, whereas road unit prices use million EUR/km. 
20 This effect is likely to include both the direct effect of corruption risks on prices and the indirect effects going through 
unobserved cost drivers such as detailed technical specification as long as they are correlated with corruption risks. As section 
4.2 suggests, corruption risks also influence project design.  
21 For more information (in Hungarian) see :  
http://index.hu/gazdasag/2015/06/19/nem_epul_meg_az_m4-es_autopalya/;  
http://nol.hu/gazdasag/tudtak-mertek-tettek-1531823; 
http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20150404_nepszabadsag_kirugja_a_kozgepet_a_kormany; 
http://index.hu/gazdasag/2015/04/07/m4_autopalya_leallitas_miniszterelnokseg_nemeth_laszlone_lazar_unio_kartellgyanu/ 
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Table 5. Average unit price increase as a function of Corruption Risk Index (regression coefficient), 
%, transport infrastructure, 2010-201422 
Model description Region controls 
Region, geography, 
price level controls 
Dependent variable: unit price 
CRI 5770353.2* 6431910.6* 
 (0.021) (0.032) 
   
Km -155132.8** -144157.8** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Express road 1648830.8 2057738.1 
 (0.171) (0.081) 
   
Complex 1152491.7 1156695.1 
 (0.052) (0.055) 
   
Shannon-index  10933458.1 
  (0.118) 
   
Civil engineering price level  3602.6 
  (0.805) 
   
Observations 97 96 
R-squared 0.257 0.303 
  
Notes: p-values in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors clustered by region 
5. Conclusions and policy lessons 
This article presented a unique summary of the existing literature of transportation investment related 
corruption risks and the associated costs. It also provided a novel measurement approach to corruption and its 
effects on spending structure and prices by using newly collected, high resolution, EU-wide government 
contracting data on transport-related public procurement tenders. Countries in greatest need of investment in 
transportation infrastructure and those receiving the bulk of EU Funds are those which have the highest 
corruption risks. Central- and Eastern European and Mediterranean countries procure transportation 
infrastructure development at about 2-3 times higher corruption risks than Western European countries. 
The review of international evidence on the effects of corruption in transport infrastructure showed three 
direct ways through which public goals can be compromised: 1) distortion of spending structure and project 
design; 2) inflation of prices; and 3) contribution to delayed, low quality, or incomplete provision. This article 
investigated the first two effects in detail by using novel data and indicators. Findings suggest that corruption 
can steer infrastructure spending towards high value investments, especially in high corruption risk regions of 
Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and Italy. In our regression models, increasing Corruption Risk Index (CRI) 
for example from a low corruption risk Danish region (DK04) to a high corruption risk Czech region (CZ07) 
(increasing CRI by 0.36) is associated with an approximately 6.3% point increase in the largest three projects’ 
share in total spending. Corruption is also likely to inflate prices. For example, in a simple regression model 
controlling for macro region, road length, road type, project complexity, geographical features, and civil 
                                                                
22 The sample partly follows from a manual data collection. The road length data was collected from tender announcement 
documents, which causes some degree of selection bias (less transparency considered is a good way to hinder competitive 
bidding). The variable complex is a dummy variable, controlling for additional investments in the projects (bridges, several 
road crossings, viaducts etc.). Shannon-index is a control for land cover variability, while civil engineering costs are used as a 
proxy for labour costs (both variables come from Eurostat data). Note, that we also estimated these effects with the transport 
investment specific CRI and the results remain positive and significant. For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results 
separately. 
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engineering price level, moving from the CRI of an average Bulgarian to an average Swedish road construction 
project (i.e. ~1.5 standard deviation increase or ~1 additional red flag) is associated with a EUR 1.2 million or 
~35% increase in the cost of 1 kilometre new road construction compared to the average road price in the 
sample. Such effect size is in line with prior research using independent samples, but comparable methodology.  
Our findings show the potential for future analysis using Big Data on transport infrastructure projects 
providing new insights in addition to existing case study research and analysis using country-level indicators. 
Nevertheless, our work only represents the first step in this direction with a number of limitations. Crucially, our 
evidence is only suggestive of causal relationships calling for further work precisely identifying causal 
mechanisms. Furthermore, detailed data on projects as well as contract implementation will over time 
complement our dataset on the tendering process and contract award in order to gain a more complete picture of 
when and how corruption can influence infrastructure provision. Detailed case studies carefully selected based 
on the here presented Big Data analysis could provide further crucial cues as to how precisely corruption 
impacts accrue.  
The evidence presented here demonstrates  the detrimental effects of corruption in transport infrastructure 
development and adds to the growing concern that many countries heavily investing in infrastructure achieve 
value for money and the desired outcomes. Tighter, real-time monitoring of corruption risks on the contract 
level would allow for early intervention and preventive measures curbing the cost of corruption in infrastructure 
provision.   
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Appendix A: Regressions underlying the Corruption Risk Index (CRI) 
 
 
Table A1. Binary logistic regression results on contract level, 2009-2014, EU27+Norway, average 
marginal effects reported, N=1,306,025, all regressions contain control variables: buyer sector, buyer 
type, year, product market, contract value, country 
Dependent variable single bid=1 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
no call for tender 
published 
0.182**     0.120** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) 
restricted 
procedure 
 0.188**    0.141** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
risky evaluation 
criteria 
  0.038**   0.039** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
extreme submission 
period 
   0.008**  0.014** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
extreme decision 
period 
    0.034** 0.057** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.143 0.145 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.151 
Note: p-values in parentheses;*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Source: Fazekas & Kocsis (2017), Table 1. 
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Appendix B: Macro-region definitions 
Table B1. Definition of EU macro-regions 
Macro region Countries 
Anglo-Saxon countries IE, UK 
Central and Eastern Europe 
(countries of the 2004 and 
2007 EU accession rounds) BG, HR, CZ, CY, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, RO, SK, SI 
Continental Western Europe AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL 
Mediterranean Europe GR, IT, PT, ES 
Nordic countries DK, FI, SE 
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Appendix C: Infrastructure definitions 
Generally, we refined the CPV code classification based on 'additional CPV' codes. In case of having a 
more precise additional CPV code in comparison to the main CPV code, and if no contradicting additional CPV 
codes were used in the given contract, then the more precise additional CPV code was used for classification. 
E.g. in case of having 45000000 (Construction works) as the main CPV code, and only one additional CPV code 
was given, which is 45233100 (Construction work for highways, roads), then this latter code was used in order 
to have a better sample. 
The (refined) CPV codes defining the different types of infrastructure categories are enlisted below. In 
certain cases, the categorization also depends on additional CPV codes, e.g. if the main CPV is construction 
material, but the additional CPV codes specify whether they belong to road, rail etc. construction, then the items 
are categorized based on these additional codes. 
 
Table C1. CPV codes used for defining different infrastructure sectors 
Sector CPV codes used 
Road construction 
 Between 45233000 and 45234000: Construction, foundation 
and surface works for highways, roads 
 45221111: Road bridge construction work 
 44113000: Road-construction materials 
 44113700: Road-repair materials 
 44113900: Road-maintenance materials 
 44113310: Coated road materials 
 44811000: Road paint 
 44113800: Road-surfacing materials 
 All material related CPV (beyond 44000000) if the additional 
CPV code is related to road construction (beyond 45000000) 
 Road equipments: between 34920000 and 34930000 
 50232000 : Maintenance services of public-lighting 
installations and traffic lights 
 50232100 : Street-lighting maintenance services 
 50232110 : Commissioning of public lighting installations 
 50232200 : Traffic-signal maintenance services 
 Between 71311210 and 71311220: Architectural works related 
to road construction 
 Any architectural works (beyond 71000000) if additional CPV 
code is related to road construction (between 45233000 and 
45234000) 
Railway construction 
 Between 45234100 and 45234240: Construction work for 
railways and cable transport systems 
 45221112: Railway bridge construction work 
 45213321: Railway station construction work 
 45213320: Construction work for buildings relating to railway 
transport 
 45221242: Railway tunnel construction work 
 Equipment: 
 34940000 : Railway equipment 
 34941000 : Rails and accessories 
 34942000 : Signalling equipment 
 34943000 : Train-monitoring system 
 34944000 : Points heating system 
 34945000 : Track-alignment machinery 
 34946000 : Railway-track construction materials and supplies 
 50225000 : Railway-track maintenance services 
 71311230 : Railway engineering services 
 Any architectural works (beyond 71000000) if additional CPV 
code is related to rail construction (between 45234100 and 
45234240) 
Airport construction  Between 45235000 and 45235320: Construction work for 
airfields, runways and manoeuvring surfaces 
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 45213331: Airport buildings construction work 
 45213332: Airport control tower construction work 
 Equipment: 
 34960000 : Airport equipment  
 34961000 : Baggage-handling system  
 34962000 : Air-traffic control equipment  
 34963000 : Instrument Landing System (ILS)  
 34964000 : Doppler VHF Omni direction Range (DVOR)  
 34965000 : Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)  
 34966000 : Radio Direction Finder and Non Directional 
Beacon 
 34967000 : Airport Communication System (COM) 
 34968000 : Airport Surveillance System and Lighting System  
 34969000 : Passenger boarding bridges and stairs for aircraft  
 34995000 : Lighting for aircraft guidance and illumination  
 34997000 : Control, safety or signalling equipment for airport 
 34997100 : Flight recorders  
 34997200 : Airport lighting  
 34997210 : Runway lights  
 34999200 : Aerial signal splitters  
 Engineering: 
 71311240: Airport engineering services 
 72212120: Flight control software development services 
 72212121: Air traffic control software development services 
 72212130: Aviation ground support and test software 
development services 
 72212131: Aviation ground support software development 
services 
 72212132: Aviation test software development services 
Water transport 
 Between 45240000 and 45248500: Construction work for 
water projects 
 Equipment: 
 34930000 : Marine equipment 
 34931000 : Harbour equipment 
 34932000 : Radar sets 
 34933000 : Navigation equipment 
 34934000 : Propeller blades 
 34994000 : Lighting for ship guidance and illumination 
 34994100 : Lighting for river guidance and illumination 
 34998000 : Control, safety or signalling equipment for port 
installations 
 Repair 
 50240000 : Repair, maintenance and associated services related 
to marine and other equipment 
 50241000 : Repair and maintenance services of ships 
 50242000 : Conversion services of ships 
 50243000 : Demolition services of ships 
 50244000 : Reconditioning services of ships or boats 
 50245000 : Upgrading services of ships 
 50246000 : Harbour equipment maintenance services 
 Architectural/engineering 
 71631460 : Dam-inspection services 
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Appendix D: Additional regression tables 
Table D1. OLS regressions explaining the share of 3 largest infrastructure contracts in total 
transport infrastructure spending using the transport investment specific CRI indicator, 2009-2014, 
region-year-sector observations 
Model Nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model descr. 
no controls 
infr. type 
control 
infr. type, 
country & year 
control 
infr. type, 
country, year, 
gdp, # of 
contracts 
control 
Dependent variable: share of largest 3 contracts 
avg. regional CRI 0.174** 0.156** 0.181** 0.156* 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.050) (0.099) 
 
    
Public works share 0.170*** 0.165*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
Ref.cat.: Road     
 
    
Rail  0.0309 0.0109 -0.0142 
 
 (0.400) (0.733) (0.679) 
 
    
Airport  0.00893 -0.0227 -0.0416 
 
 (0.924) (0.803) (0.672) 
 
    
Water transport  0.0216 0.0168 0.00190 
 
 (0.481) (0.543) (0.957) 
 
    
# of contracts    -0.00560*** 
 
   (0.005) 
 
    
Observations 497 497 497 457 
R-squared 0.069 0.072 0.259 0.350 
Notes: p-values in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors clustered by country 
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Table D2. Fixed-effects panel regressions explaining the share of 3 largest infrastructure contracts 
in total transport infrastructure spending using the economy-wide CRI indicator, 2009-2014, region-
year-sector observations, region-sector fixed-effects applied 
Model Nr. (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: share of largest 3 contracts 
avg. regional CRI 0.478** 0.488** 0.389* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.025) 
 
   
Public works share 0.163 0.173 0.121 
 (0.083) (0.063) (0.195) 
 
   
# of contracts   -0.00559 
 
  (0.051) 
Year control  X X 
    
# of contracts   X 
    
Observations 493 493 493 
R-squared 0.071 0.086 0.177 
Notes: p-values in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; standard errors clustered by 
country 
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Table D3. Multilevel regression model explaining relative price (final/estimated price) using the 
economy-wide CRI indicator, 2009-2014 
Model Nr. (1) 
Dependent variable: relative price 
CRI 0.162*** 
 (0.000) 
Ref.cat.: Road  
 
 
Rail 0.017 
 (0.092) 
Airport 0.016 
 (0.339) 
Water_transport -0.038*** 
 (0.000) 
Contract value X 
 
 
Buyer sector X 
 
 
Buyer type X 
 
 
Year X 
    
Random-effects parameters 
CRI 0.0167 
 se: 0.0073 
Constant 0.0067 
 se: 0.0021 
Residual 0.0266 
 se: 0.004 
N 7774 
Log likelihood 2955.61 
R-squared 0.038 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; standard errors clustered by 
country 
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Table D4. Multilevel regression model explaining relative price (final/estimated price) using the 
transport investment specific CRI indicator, 2009-2014 
Model Nr. (1) 
Dependent variable: relative price 
CRI (transport specific) 0.136*** 
 (0.000) 
Ref.cat.: Road  
 
 
Rail 0.013 
 (0.175) 
Airport 0.012 
 (0.481) 
Water_transport -0.036*** 
 (0.000) 
Contract value X 
 
 
Buyer sector X 
 
 
Buyer type X 
 
 
Year X 
    
Random-effects parameters 
CRI 0.0167 
 se: 0.0073 
Constant 0.0067 
 se: 0.0021 
Residual 0.0266 
 se: 0.004 
N 7774 
Log likelihood 2996.65 
R-squared 0.047 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; standard errors clustered by 
country 
 
